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1. Introduction. 
Whether, how, and where social values enter (and have entered) into scientific practice has 
been widely discussed. Moving forward requires positive accounts regarding how values 
should influence science. Philip Kitcher (2001, 2011) has pioneered offering a normative 
proposal for the determination of science’s research agenda (SRA). He calls it “well-ordered 
science” (WOS).1 On Kitcher’s view, science is well-ordered when the lines of research 
conducted are those that would be decided by a group of ideal deliberators under idealized 
circumstances. 
Some authors have criticized WOS for being too idealized, in that it is unable to guide 
science policy on SRA in our current non-ideal circumstances (Longino 2002; Douglas 2013; 
Fernández Pinto 2015). Kitcher has responded to this challenge claiming that it confuses 
substantive normative ideals —at which we should aim—and the ways to arrive at them 
(2002, 569, 2011, 125). He claims that WOS is both the kind of normative ideal needed and 
one that can actually provide guidance (2011, 125). 
                                                     
1 Strictly speaking, WOS includes other aspects of the practice of science (e.g., ethical 
restrictions for experiments), but here I focus only on the normative standard as it applies to 
SRA. 
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I argue here that WOS’s problem of guidance remains even under the aims/means distinction, 
because the failure of WOS is more basic than other critics have suggested. Kitcher 
understands WOS as a hypothetical procedure, the result of which constitutes the ideal SRA. 
I argue here that the result of this hypothetical procedure cannot be known, so WOS provides 
no identifiable ideal SRA that can serve as a standard of comparison for our actual SRA. 
Thus, Kitcher’s reply that the action-guidance criticism confuses ideals and the ways to 
arrive at them is not true of the version of the criticism presented here. 
In what follows, I will present WOS as described by Kitcher (2), clarify its nature as an ideal-
theory (3) of a specific kind (4), and argue that WOS provides no identifiable standard (5). 
2. Well-Ordered Science. 
To propose an ideal SRA, Kitcher imagines an idealized procedure consisting in a group of 
deliberators, representing all the affected perspectives, being mutually engaged and tutored 
by scientists. The latter condition work as a “cognitive restriction” and the former as an 
“affective restriction,” in the sense that both are meant to avoid “myopic voters choosing in 
ignorance of the possibilities, and of the consequences for others, completely absorbed in 
their own self-directed wishes” (2011, 113). In this way, the resulting list of lines of research 
to be pursued is expected to consider (i) the scientists’ expertise (regarding which research 
projects are plausible and what are their likely consequences for the various social needs that 
society deems “significant”); (ii) the deliberators’ inputs (knowledge on the needs and values 
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of all the affected parties); (iii) and the deliberators’ ethical-deliberative capacity (in 
balancing, under conditions of mutual engagement, the extremely diverse and sometimes 
conflicting claims present). 
Having detailed this idealized procedure, Kitcher then proposes that the normative standard 
for SRA consists in the research projects that would be decided by such a procedure (2001, 
122-3, 2011, 114). 
3. Ideal-Theories and WOS. 
Since Kitcher claims that a major obstacle in the literature on science policy has been the 
lack of a normative ideal, he aims to contribute by putting forth “a first shot at the kind of 
standard we need” (2001, 146 emphasis added). It is hard to find opposition to the claim that 
we need some (sort of) normative standard(s) for guiding policy. The debate is whether the 
kind of standard we need is one of the kind that Kitcher offers, which since Rawls (1999) has 
been called “ideal theory.” This kind of standard involves the construction of an end-state—
e.g., the features of “a perfectly just society” (Rawls 1999, 8). The details of this end-state 
Copyright The Philosophy of Science Association 2019. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted). 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/707539
This content downloaded from 131.111.223.065 on February 21, 2020 03:08:01 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
  5 
involve heavy departure from actual and likely contexts of the real world (what is called 
“idealization”).2  
Although contemporary political philosophy draws heavily from “ideal theory,” challenges to 
its normative justification and capacity to guide action have become widespread in the last 
decades. Some challenges have to do with the relevance of ideal theories in non-ideal 
circumstances (Valentini 2009). In the case of WOS, this kind of criticism has been made by 
Longino (2002), and developed in more detail by Fernández Pinto (2015). Other political 
theorists contend that the idealizations adopted in some ideal theories tend to mislead more 
than guide political action (Mills 2005; Wiens 2012), while others have questioned the moral 
weight of the hypothetical consent usually present in ideal theories (Jaggar 1993). In the case 
of WOS, this last kind of criticism is echoed by Douglas (2013) and (more fully) by Keren 
(2015). 
As defenders of Rawlsian ideal theorizing also acknowledge (Robeyns 2008; Simmons 
2010), Kitcher has been eager to emphasize that more empirical knowledge is needed in 
order to guide specific political action. However, he has defended WOS claiming that an 
ideal is “something at which our practices should aim,” and this is conceptually different 
                                                     
2 Standard examples of idealizations are the attribution to human beings of degrees of 
rationality and moral capacities not found in most actual human beings. For characterizations 
of ideal-theory see (Mills 2005; Robeyns 2008; Simmons 2010; Valentini 2009). 
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from the identification of concrete institutional arrangements that would bring about the ideal 
(2011, 125). He acknowledges that “meaningful ideals are those for which we can envisage a 
path that might lead us toward them” (2011, 125). Thus, some guidance from the ideal to 
institutional arrangements is to be expected. But, on his view, WOS fares well in this regard 
because it does provide such a guidance, as he illustrates by giving an example (discussed 
below). Moreover, he claims—echoing Rawls’ (1999) defense of ideal theory as something 
prior to non-ideal theory—that ideal accounts are necessary because “without some 
understanding of where you want to go, efforts to improve on the status quo will be leaps in 
the dark” (2011, 125). Thus, Kitcher’s response to the lack of action-guidance critique is to 
defend WOS on the grounds that (i) such an ideal is needed, and that (ii) WOS is an ideal that 
can actually provide guidance, by giving a concrete example. 
I challenge (ii) below. Regarding (i), it has been already challenged by Sen (2009), who 
criticizes the exclusive focus on “end-states” ideals over “transitional accounts” when the 
concern is eminently practical (as it is in the case of science policy). Sen argues that “end-
states” ideals are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining improvements, and 
assessing improvements is exactly what we need to avoid “leaps in the dark.” Regarding 
necessity, on many occasions we can certainly know whether a new scenario, say, the 
reduction of gender discrimination, is an improvement in justice, even if we don’t know how 
a perfectly just society looks. Moreover, “end-states” are not sufficient because merely 
knowing the end-state ideal doesn’t necessarily help us in knowing how far we are from it at 
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each scenario, nor in knowing if we are getting closer to it when the scenario changes.3 Thus, 
Kitcher’s claim that an ideal-theory (“end-state”) is needed for guiding science policy is 
unjustified. 
4. Ideal-Answers and Ideal-Procedures. 
There has been some lack of clarity in the literature on the exact nature of WOS as an ideal-
theory (see Douglas 2013; Fernández Pinto 2015; Shaw 2018). For example, it’s unclear 
whether the specific way WOS is expected to set standards for policy depends on the stage of 
the scientific practice we are considering (e.g., the agenda setting, the determination of 
ethical constraints on experiments, etc.). To make headway clarifying WOS, I will, first, 
suggest two ways in which we can read the kind of ideal-theory Kitcher is proposing. WOS 
is explicitly framed in line with the Rawlsian project about normative principles (Kitcher 
2001, 211), so parallels with Rawls’ work will be useful here. 
                                                     
3 To be clear, none of the critics of ideal-theorizing argues for the implausible claim that we 
don’t need normative standards for guiding action. The critique is rather targeting the 
particular way of providing standards that ideal-theory (understood technically) consists in 
(i.e., the focus on end-states, the construction of which involves highly idealized 
assumptions). That we do need normative ideals, such as equality, freedom, and the like, for 
guiding action is not in question (see Mills 2005, 168; Wiens 2012, 55). 
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I think an important distinction can be made between normative ideals that constitute an 
answer to the normative question at stake (“ideal-answers”) and ideals that constitute a 
procedure for answering the normative question (“ideal-procedures”). An example of the first 
type of ideal is Rawls’ (1999) principles of justice. They constitute an answer to the question, 
“What does a just society look like?” Although the actual normative answer that Rawls gives 
is derived from his hypothetical procedure, called “the original position,” his answer is 
independent of the procedure in the following sense. It could be derived from and justified by 
other arguments,4 and, more importantly, we don’t need to reimplement the procedure once 
we know the answer. In other words, in the case of normative ideals of the first kind, “ideal-
answers,” what we should aim at is the result of the hypothetical procedure, not the 
procedure. 
An example of the second type of ideal, what I’m calling an “ideal-procedure,” could be 
“democracy” understood as follows. One way of answering the question “Who should 
govern?” is by specifying an idealized procedure (e.g. free, regular, competitive, and fair 
elections, one vote per adult, etc.). Here, the normative answer is naturally dependent on the 
procedure in the sense meant above. The specific content of the answer is known only via 
implementing an empirical version of the idealized procedure, and the justification of that 
answer depends on the justification of the procedure. The ideal (that at which our practices 
                                                     
4 Like Rawls’ “informal” arguments (1999, chap. 2) 
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should aim) is the idealized procedure. So, the answer to the normative question (in all its 
required detail) comes out only via mimicking the idealized procedure as close as possible. In 
contrast with ideal-answers, the procedure is never left behind, so to speak. 
In this taxonomy, Kitcher’s WOS should be classified as an ideal-answer. Kitcher claims that 
the ideal we should aim at is not the idealized procedure, but consists of the answers 
provided by the hypothetical procedure. Thus, we achieve the ideal not by instituting 
empirical versions of the idealized procedure, but when the institutional arrangements, 
whatever they are, “invariably lead to investigations that coincide” with the ones that would 
have been decided by the ideal deliberators (2001, 122 author’s emphasis). Furthermore, 
continues Kitcher, “there’s no thought that well-ordered science must actually institute the 
complicated discussions I’ve envisaged. …. Quite probably, setting up a vast population-
wide discussion that mimicked the ideal procedure would be an extraordinarily bad idea, 
precisely because transactions among non-ideal agents are both imperfect and costly. So the 
challenge is to find institutions that generate roughly the right results, even though we have 
no ideal deliberators to make the instantaneous decisions we hope to replicate” (2001, 123). 
Thus, the ideal that WOS consists in is specified by the conclusions of ideal deliberators, that 
is, by the specific lines of research they would select, and not by the idealized procedure. 
This is analogous to the ideal of social justice that Rawls proposes, which is specified by the 
conclusions arrived at by his ideal deliberators in the original position (i.e. his principles of 
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justice), and not by the original position as a procedure to imitate for choosing principles of 
justice in real life. 
One important exegetical clarification is in place, because changes in Kitcher’s presentation 
of WOS between his (2001) and his (2011) have produced confusion about what kind of 
ideal Kitcher is advocating. In some parts of (2011), Kitcher seems to endorse an ideal-
procedure reading of his general proposal for the governing of science (e.g., 2011, 231). 
However, this support for a procedural reading doesn’t occur when he discusses the SRA 
aspect of WOS, but only occurs when he discusses other (simpler) stages of the practice of 
science (e.g., deciding rules for experimenting with animals). To leave no doubts about the 
correct reading of WOS for SRA, in his (2011) Kitcher repeats explicitly the indictment that 
“any actual conversation of this type is impossible” (115, author’s emphasis). It’s worth 
noting that other commentators have also read WOS for SRA in the same way (Longino 
2002; Douglas 2013; Keren 2013). At any rate, in case there is any lingering doubt, the fact 
that Kitcher mentions some (detailed) conclusions at which ideal deliberators will arrive 
regarding SRA (see below) should suffice to convince us that he is taking WOS as an ideal-
answer for SRA. 
5. The Problem with WOS. 
I now argue that Kitcher’s WOS, understood as an ideal-answer, cannot be action-guiding 
because the ideal it consists in (i.e., the conclusions of his ideal deliberators) cannot be 
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known. I will argue for this negative conclusion by highlighting the challenge of arriving at 
the conclusions of WOS’s ideal deliberators. Making a contrast between this challenge and 
Rawls’ (1999) challenge, I hope to make plain the extreme difficulty (if not impossibility) for 
anybody to arrive at WOS’s conclusions. However, Kitcher does claim to know what the 
ideal deliberators’ answer will be for a particular case. If he is right that such an answer can 
be inferred from WOS, this would seem to rebut my criticism. Nevertheless, I will show that 
such an answer is both insufficient for the task at hand and, more problematically, 
underdetermined by WOS. Hence it cannot be used as a counterexample to my claim that we 
just can’t know ideal deliberators’ answers. Finally, I’ll assess whether we could know these 
answers empirically. 
To visualize the challenge, recall that the task is to infer the decisions of WOS’s ideal 
deliberators with regards to exactly which research projects (among all the ones available in 
our current circumstances) should be pursued and to what extent (Kitcher 2001, 116, Kitcher 
2011, 105). Let me contrast this with how Rawls’ (1999) sets up the task. Rawls’ deliberators 
are to choose, under the veil of ignorance, and from a short list of candidates, their preferred 
principles of justice. Rawls was highly conscious of the challenges of knowing the resulting 
principles.5 His way of dealing with the challenge was to radically simplify the set-up: (i) the 
                                                     
5 “If this view of the problem of justification is to succeed, we must, of course, describe in 
some detail the nature of this choice problem. A problem of rational decision has a definite 
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inputs of the process are simplified by the veil of ignorance (so that the deliberators don’t 
bring any contextual information to the conversation), and by the assumptions of self-interest 
and of a fixed list of primary social goods that are pursued by all (so that the deliberators 
don’t differ in preferences). Moreover, (ii) the possible outputs of the process are simplified 
by the fact that deliberators choose among a fixed (and short) list of candidates. This 
simplification of inputs and possible outputs allows Rawls to frame his normative question as 
a formal choice problem that may be solved by resorting to decision theory under 
uncertainty. However, even for this (most simplified) case, the debate regarding whether 
Rawls correctly inferred the principles hasn’t ended (Gustafsson 2018).  
What about WOS’s ideal deliberators’ task? Here we have none of the simplifications Rawls 
enjoys. Ideal deliberators are supposed to represent “all the alternative perspectives present in 
the human population, including those of people yet unborn” (2011, 116). Kitcher makes 
clear that WOS (unlike Rawls’ original position) is not restricted to the perspectives of the 
members of a single country (2011, 116-18). The reason for including people representing 
“all perspectives” has to do with the fact that WOS aims to balance the interests of all those 
                                                     
answer only if we know the beliefs and interests of the parties, their relations with respect to 
one another, the alternatives between which they are to choose, the procedure whereby they 
make up their minds, and so on” (Rawls 1999, 16). 
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affected by SRA. This global aspect of WOS places a tremendous difficulty on anyone 
intending to predict the outcome of this ideal deliberation.  
The challenge doesn’t come only via the inputs, however. The possible outputs of the ideal 
deliberation are not a short list of research projects that need to be voted with a yes/no. 
Rather, it is the generation of a whole list of all the research projects to be supported, and the 
extent they should be supported. Although the emphasis placed by Kitcher (2011) on one-off 
decisions—e.g., supporting the Human Genome Project or not—might make the task of 
predicting ideal deliberators’ answers look somewhat accessible, the fact of the matter 
remains that WOS’ deliberators’ task is a much more complex one. Thus, I see no reason to 
think that any individual might be able to predict this detailed hypothetical deliberation.  
Moreover, Kitcher himself—unlike Rawls’ (1999)—doesn’t provide us with the answers of 
WOS’s deliberators. In fact, he acknowledges that in many cases it is “hard to predict” what 
ideal deliberators would decide (2011, 123). Now, as I mentioned, Kitcher does claim to 
know one particular answer, regarding the research projects of biomedicine. And he mentions 
it with the explicit intention of rejecting the claim that WOS is not action-guiding. However, 
I’ll show that Kitcher’s answer is not only insufficient for the task, but also underdetermined 
by WOS. 
The current state of biomedical research has been criticized for its disproportionate emphasis 
on treatments that mostly benefit well-off patients. This has been called the “10/90 gap” 
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(Flory and Kitcher 2004). Kitcher claims that ideal deliberators, in contrast with the prevalent 
10/90 gap, would endorse “the fair-share principle. Waiving considerations of tractability, 
each disease should be investigated according to its contribution to the total suffering caused 
by disease” (2011, 122). 6 
The idea of inferring the deliberators’ choices by predicting normative principles endorsed by 
them (and use the principles to deduce the chosen projects when presented with the 
alternatives) seems more plausible than to go one by one through each of the research 
projects available. However, this proposal is not sufficient for the task at hand. It might be 
plausible to predict specific principles for priorities within each research area—like the fair-
share principle. But we need more than that. We need to determine decisions about research 
projects both within and between research areas. Kitcher can suggest a simple principle for 
one area (biomedicine) because it may seem plausible to weigh all the pertinent research 
problems (say, solutions to diseases) of that area with a single metric of significance (in this 
case, “suffering caused by disease”). But simple principles are not possible when there are 
research problems to be compared that are of a radically different nature (e.g. education vs. 
                                                     
6 The strength of Kitcher’s conviction regarding the fair-share principle shouldn’t be 
underestimated: “Whether or not [WOS] is adopted, we maintain that a necessary condition 
for well-ordered science is that research [agenda]… should accord with the ‘fair-share’ 
principle” (Reiss and Kitcher 2009, 263 emphasis added).  
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health vs. cosmology). Which is the unique metric to be used? 7 Bear in mind that, under 
Kitcher’s account, we cannot say that the unique metric is “well-being” defined by some 
objective standard. In constructing WOS, Kitcher has rejected this option, endorsing a 
subjectivist notion of well-being. Thus, though it would be possible to claim that between 
areas projects should be supported to the extent that they maximize well-being, it is not 
possible to infer the actual answers (we don’t know what well-being is for each person). All 
said, this proposal is insufficient for giving us the complete ideal-answer. 
Even more damaging, successfully predicting principles seems doubtful even within areas. 
That ideal deliberators would arrive at (or choose according to) the fair-share principle 
cannot be determined only by drawing from WOS. There are a number of alternative 
principles that could plausibly be entertained and endorsed by WOS’ ideal deliberators. First, 
Kitcher takes at face value that the only morally relevant metric is the total suffering caused 
by disease. This assumes a total utility approach. But he could as well have suggested that the 
research agenda should be biased in favor of diseases that affect people who are worst-off. 
Second, although Kitcher does not say how deliberators would balance ‘tractability’ and 
                                                     
7 As Weinberg commented in an analogous debate, once we have decided to centralize the 
priority decisions of all science (as WOS does), deliberators are faced with the task of 
“measuring the merit of incommensurable ... scientific fields ... on the same scale of values” 
(Weinberg 1963, 167). 
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‘contribution to suffering’, he suggests that ‘tractability’ should be seriously considered 
(2011, 122). This is, of course, a reasonable position, one that considers the efficiency of 
efforts. If treatment for sickness X is less likely (or costlier) to be discovered than for 
sickness Y, efficiency says society should invest more research efforts in Y than in X, all 
other things being equal. However, there are a number of areas in which (many) societies 
agree on each individual having an “equal claim” to some fundamental goods, and this is so 
regardless of the varying costs for attaining those fundamental goods for specific populations 
(i.e., regardless of efficiency). And health happens to be one such area. Since suffering X 
versus Y can usually be considered arbitrary from a moral point of view, it seems at least 
plausible for ideal deliberators to disregard ‘tractability’ considerations (perhaps until some 
limit) and invest equally in both treatments (according to an equal effort principle) or even 
more in treatment X (according to an equal expected results principle). 
The issue here is not the obvious point that there are alternative conceptions of justice that 
Kitcher might have considered. Rather, the issue is that there is nothing in WOS that allows 
Kitcher (nor anybody else) to anticipate one of the alternative conceptions of justice as the 
one chosen, and accordingly to derive principles for assigning priorities within disciplines 
that would match ideal deliberators’ decisions. So, the biomedicine example that Kitcher 
offers as a proof of WOS’s action guidance, I conclude, gives no plausibility to the idea that, 
via considering general principles within areas, we could predict the ideal deliberators’ SRA. 
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Given the difficulty in predicting a-priori ideal deliberators’ answers, an alternative might be 
to use mini-publics to predict them.8 I don’t think this is possible. To be confident in 
predicting the answers, we need to replicate (to some reasonable degree) the procedure. It 
seems clear that this is not possible in Rawls’ case, because many aspects of his original 
position are highly idealized. Thus, they are difficult to replicate empirically (e.g., the veil of 
ignorance, the high stakes of the decision, etc.). But the procedure depicted by Kitcher is also 
highly idealized and difficult to replicate. To be sure, the idealizations used by Kitcher are 
not the same as those used by Rawls—Kitcher doesn’t use a veil of ignorance, and the stakes 
are not of the same kind. But Kitcher’s idealizations are not much more (and arguably even 
less) replicable. Let me mention the two most salient:  
(i) Kitcher says that his ideal deliberators are expected to represent each and every interest 
(world-wide, current and future) affected by SRA. This, as argued by Goodin (2007), entails 
that all interests need to be represented: when the decisions to be taken are such that may 
affect every interest, then every interest is in fact affected. This idealization (i.e., representing 
all the perspectives) seems, to say the least, hard to replicate to a reasonable degree. 
                                                     
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. This possibility, to be clear, is 
different from taking WOS to be an ideal-procedure, where the idealized procedure is the 
normative standard we aim at, not an idealized method to predict the actual normative 
standard. 
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(ii) Kitcher describes his idealized deliberators as follow. “Built in to the ideal of discussion 
under mutual engagement are cognitive and affective constraints … the ideal 
conversationalists are to have a wide understanding of the various lines of research, what 
they might accomplish, how various findings would affect others, how those others adjust 
their starting preferences, and the conversationalists are dedicated to promoting the wishes 
other participants eventually form” (2011, 113). 
It is hard to see how this cognitive idealization—all parties are expected to have a wide 
understanding of the various lines of research— can be empirically replicated. And the 
affective idealization seems even more implausible to replicate—all parties are expected to 
dedicate themselves to promote the wishes of others. We can, of course, actually conduct 
mini-publics trying to emulate to some degree (quite minimum, to be sure) these 
idealizations. But, given the idealized circumstances “built in to the ideal discussion” by 
Kitcher, we cannot be confident in empirically predicting the ideal deliberators’ answers.  
6. Conclusion. 
Kitcher, like Rawls (1999), understands WOS as a hypothetical deliberative procedure, the 
conclusions of which we should aim at. This makes WOS a normative standard of the kind I 
call an “ideal-answer”. I’ve argued here that, since those answers cannot be known, WOS 
provides no identifiable ideal research agenda as a benchmark against which we can assess 
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the research agenda of real-world science. Thus, the action-guidance problem of WOS is not 
one of application of its normative standard, but a more basic one.   
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